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and the National Security Risks They Pose

Abstract
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The dissemination of deep fakes for nefarious purposes poses significant national security risks
to the United States, requiring an urgent development of technologies to detect their use and
strategies to mitigate their effects. Deep fakes are images and videos created by or with the
assistance of AI algorithms in which a person’s likeness, actions, or words have been replaced
by someone else’s to deceive an audience. Often created with the help of generative adversarial
networks, deep fakes can be used to blackmail, harass, exploit, and intimidate individuals and
businesses; in large-scale disinformation campaigns, they can incite political tensions around
the world and within the U.S. Their broader implication is a deepening challenge to truth in
public discourse. The U.S. government, independent researchers, and private companies must
collaborate to improve the effectiveness and generalizability of detection methods that can stop
the spread of deep fakes.
Keywords: deep fakes, artificial intelligence, machine learning, generative adversarial
networks, national security, disinformation, foreign influence operations
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The dissemination of deep fakes for nefarious purposes
poses significant national security risks to the United
States, requiring an urgent development of technologies to detect their use and strategies to mitigate their
effects in the public sphere. Deep fakes are images or
videos in which a person's likeness, actions, or words
have been replaced by someone else’s. Deep fakes illustrate how many of the newest national security threats
that the United States faces are becoming more technologically advanced and more accessible and easier to
operate by motivated individuals and groups.

tic photos and videos and hampering efforts to create
detection algorithms and other countermeasures. Government organizations, independent researchers, and
private companies have made significant progress in
detecting deep fakes; however, their work has lagged
behind the pace with which deep fakes are being developed. There are opportunities to create better, more
generalized detection methods to combat the harmful
effects of deep fakes.

An interconnected global population and the prevalence of smartphones and social media have enabled unprecedented communication and access to information;
these technologies have also opened up new avenues of
attack. Known as “disinformation tactics,” the threats
take many forms, including social media bot networks,
fake news stories, blackmail, hacking campaigns, and
deep fakes. Disinformation tactics meant to attack an
individual or the public’s consumption of information
and understanding of the world are not new; however,
new technologies have allowed their effects to become
more widespread and harmful. It is likely that deep
fakes will be used in disinformation campaigns by nation state adversaries like Russia and China.

Deep fakes are images and videos created by or with
the assistance of AI algorithms to deceive an audience.
A deep fake could be a realistic photo of a human who
does not actually exist, or a video of a public figure saying or doing something they did not actually say or do.
The AI algorithms that create deep fakes differ in many
ways from the more common applications that AI and
machine learning have in our lives. The goal of AI is to
create programs able to “learn” in order to solve problems that would ordinarily be too difficult for a computer. AI programs may be presented with data which they
learn from to make predictions about previously unseen
but related data. For example, a simple AI program may
be trained to classify the species of an iris flower. The
program does this by learning the features of the data
set, in this case the lengths and widths of the petals
and sepals, and then using that information to make
informed predictions about a new data set. Deep fake
creation differs in that the AI does not make a prediction about new data presented to it; instead, it creates
new data. These algorithms are known as generative adversarial networks (GANs), and recent innovations have
spurred research and development, leading to the emergence of deep fakes

Deep fakes have the potential in both
domestic and foreign contexts to sow
discord, spread misinformation, damage
reputations, and otherwise harm the
interests of the United States.
Deep fakes have the potential in both domestic and foreign contexts to sow discord, spread misinformation,
damage reputations, and otherwise harm the interests
of the United States. Domestically, deep fakes pose a
threat to U.S. political and economic processes by targeting specific politicians, business leaders, companies,
and news events. They also have a high potential to be
used in areas with less technological literacy and areas
under less scrutiny by the U.S., where false information
can spread for longer periods without being detected.
Countering disinformation campaigns and other malicious attacks that utilize deep fakes will require more
than just detection methods. Education and communication with the public will need to be part of any counteraction effort. It is in the best interests of the Intelligence Community to understand how deep fakes could
be used and how they can be countered.
The artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms and other programs used to create deep fakes become more sophisticated every day, improving their ability to create realis-

Deep Fake Creation

Neural Networks and GANs

The recent history of deep fakes begins with the development of artificial neural networks (ANNs). An ANN
is a machine learning model based upon a network of
neurons similar to those in the human brain. In the
brain, neurons transmit information by producing electrical impulses called action potentials which release
neurotransmitters. When a neuron receives enough of
these neurotransmitters, it releases its own action potentials, or inhibits itself, instead not firing. These neurons are connected in large networks, allowing complex
calculations to be completed. ANNs use this same architecture by connecting networks of artificial neurons
which compute huge numbers of possible combinations
depending on whether their inputs and outputs are active or not. Today, artificial neural networks are used
by businesses and researchers to accomplish highly
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complex data-intensive tasks such as classifying images,
text, and speech.
Building upon ANNs, convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) model the ways that the visual cortex processes
images to accomplish computer image recognition. Psychologists David H. Hubel and Torsten Wiesel discovered the structure and inner workings of the visual cortex by conducting experiments on cats in 1958 and 1959.
Two of their most important discoveries were that many
neurons in the visual cortex have small local receptive
fields, meaning that they only react to stimuli within
a certain region of the visual field, and that some neurons only fire in response to certain orientations of lines
and objects while not firing for others. For computer
vision and image recognition using CNNs, these discoveries mean that individual neurons in the network do
not have to be connected to each other; instead, convolutional layers are used, where neurons only examine
and respond to the parts of an image in their receptive
fields. This architecture is important for image recognition because of the high number of pixels in any given
image. Artificial and convolutional neural networks are
the backbone of deep learning programs and inform
the algorithms that create deep fakes today: generative
adversarial networks.

Artificial and convolutional neural
networks are the backbone of deep
learning programs and inform the
algorithms that create deep fakes today:
generative adversarial networks.
Generative adversarial networks were proposed in 2014
by Goodfellow et al. and have ushered in a new era of
deep learning research and experimentation, as well as
the creation of deep fakes. Goodfellow et al. proposed
a new type of generative machine learning model comprised of two competing models: a generative model
and a discriminative model. The generative and discriminative models are both neural networks, and if the
task is related to image data, it is likely that they are
both CNNs. The purpose of the discriminative model
is to determine if a sample presented to it, such as an
image, is part of an original, real data set, or if it was
created by the generative model. The generative model’s purpose is to create new samples that could have
come from the original, real data set. The models are
trained in competition with each other, where the discriminative model attempts to minimize the amount of
errors it makes in distinguishing “real” data from “fake”
data, and the generative model attempts to maximize
that error in the discriminator by creating increasingly
better fakes. Since the initial proposal by Goodfellow
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et al., there has been a surge in research to improve the
architecture, efficiency, and realism with which GANs
can produce images.

In 2016, Yann Lecun, the VP and Chief AI
Scientist at Facebook, described GANs
as "the coolest idea in deep learning in
the past 20 years."
The idea of placing two neural networks in competition
with each other is the most innovative aspect of GANs,
as each network improves the other over time. In 2016,
Yann Lecun, the VP and Chief AI Scientist at Facebook,
described GANs as “the coolest idea in deep learning in
the past 20 years.” While Goodfellow et al.’s GAN framework was revolutionary, the initial capabilities were
quite limited, as the images it generated were very low
resolution and often grainy or fuzzy. Three frameworks
that have improved the image quality and training stability of GANs since 2014 are deep convolutional GANs,
least squares GANs, and StyleGAN. These frameworks
are used in the creation of deep fakes, reducing noticeable errors and improving their realism.

Deep Fake Creation with GANs

In practice, if a GAN were trained to generate pictures
of cats, the discriminative model would be trained to
recognize a cat by using a large data set of different
pictures of cats. The generative model would then attempt to create an image that looks like a cat using only
random inputs called “noise.” At the beginning of the
process, the generative model would not be very effective, and the discriminative model would have a high
prediction rate between fake and real. As the generative
model learns more and more about what the discriminative model looks for to determine if an image is a cat, it
can improve its creation of fake cat images. The generative model never actually sees the pictures it creates. Instead, it learns the most important features of the images from information passed by the discriminator tasked
with determining whether images are fake or real.
Generative models can be used to produce three main
types of deep fake videos: face-swap, lip-sync, and puppet-master. Face-swap videos, which replace a face with
another person’s face, are the easiest and lowest quality
deep fake to produce. Mobile applications such as Snapchat have had similar features for years, and face-swapping is often obvious, as there is usually little done to
maintain consistencies such as face movements and
position. Lip-sync videos use existing videos of people,
and AI manipulates the movements of the mouth to fit
new audio. A famous example of a lip-sync deep fake is
the Buzzfeed News-produced video of Barack Obama

warning of the dangers that deep fakes and disinformation pose, with Jordan Peele serving as the voice actor.
The most realistic type of fake videos are puppet-master
videos, where a performer acts and says things that they
want the target to appear to be doing. Then, using AI
tools, the video is used to animate the target as having
said and done what the performer did.

National Security Risks

Deep fakes pose national security risks to both individuals and society as a whole in both foreign and domestic contexts. While fake images present risks, fake
video and audio allow greater flexibility and therefore
pose greater threats. Individuals targeted by deep fakes
face reputational harm, loss of employment, and theft
and identity fraud. They also may feel threatened and
powerless to respond or disprove the fakes. At a society-wide level, deep fakes can be used to spread disinformation; inflame racial, ethnic, cultural, and political
tensions; influence election outcomes; and destabilize
the U.S. economy. Changing socio-political developments like COVID-19, nationwide racial justice protests,
and national elections exacerbate existing political tensions, opening new avenues for disinformation tactics
targeting the public.

Deep fakes can be used to
spread disinformation; inflame racial,
ethnic, cultural, and political tensions;
influence election outcomes; and
destabilize the U.S. economy.
The American public first truly became aware of online
influence operations and disinformation campaigns after the Russian government’s “sweeping and systematic”
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidentialelection, when
Russian operatives hacked and disseminated a candidate's emails and spread fake news through social mediaaccounts. The Intelligence Community has assessed
that foreign actors continued their election interference schemes in the 2018 U.S. Congressional Elections
and in the 2020 U.S. presidential election. And as the
COVID-19 pandemic spread across the globe and within the U.S. in early 2020, intelligence officials watched
Chinese operatives orchestrate mass texts to millions
of Americans warning of an impending lockdown and
martial law, showing the range of options in disinformation campaigns. The U.S. Intelligence Community currently considers efforts like these a top priority, listing
them second in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment.
Deep fakes may exacerbate theproblems associated with
foreign electoral interference, as they provide unprecedented realism to false information.

Deep Fake Photos

Deep fake photos pose significant national security risks
for individuals including extortion, identity theft and
fraud, and reputational harm. Additionally, they can be
used to bolster other elements of a disinformation campaign, such as creating more realistic fake profiles and
infiltrating social networks and organizations. These
photos are likely to be created by foreign nation states,
hacking groups, and aggrieved individuals depending
on the purpose, context, and targets.
Individuals who hold positions of power within the U.S.
government, private corporations, and large organizations may be blackmailed, extorted, or threatened with
deep fake photos. A fake image of someone engaging in
drug use or other questionable activities can be used to
leverage information, money, or other things of value.
According to a Congressional Research Service report,
foreign intelligence operatives have already begun using deep fakes in social media profiles to recruit sources
in the U.S.
Deep fake photos may also be used to improve the realism of other elements of disinformation and online
influence operations. In 2019, researchers discovered
a LinkedIn profile of a woman named Katie Jones who
appeared to be deeply connected to many national security experts and other political figures in Washington.
In fact, no such Katie Jones exists, and many elements of
her profile indicate that she was likely created by a GAN.
A scaly effect on her ear, mismatched and monochromatic eyes, a blurry earring, and the indistinct background
made it clear that the photo was not real. However, the
profile was still able to connect with more than 50 users on LinkedIn, including a deputy assistant secretary
of state. Similar fake accounts are likely to be used to
connect with influential members of government and
business to siphon confidential information, create
compromising situations, or to recruit them to directly
work with foreign governments. While the Katie Jones
profile was detected quickly due to the low quality of
the image, more sophisticated efforts to fine-tune the
generation algorithm can produce fake images that fool
the naked eye.

Deep Fake Video and Audio

Deep fake video and audio productions are more likely
to pose serious national security risks at a society-wide
level than photos due to the limitless possibilities of
what can be created and shown. While the most serious
threats are likely to be in the domestic context, such as
those that target our elections and economy or try to
spark hatred and division, serious threats could emerge
from the spread of fake videos targeted at individuals
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or in other countries. The technology used to create
these videos has only gotten better, and it may now be
used to interfere in deeper, more sinister ways against
the U.S. and its citizens.
In more personal or intimate contexts, deep fake videos
can be used to harass and intimidate individuals with
blackmail or revenge porn. The first deep fake videos
emerged in 2017 when internet users interposed the faces of celebrities between those of actors in pornographic videos. Since then, researchers have found that over
90% of deep fake videos are non-consensual porn, mainly targeting women. A report by the Cyber Civil Rights
Initiative indicates that 90% of revenge porn victims
are women, and that many have suffered reputational
and emotional consequences as a result. Recent mobile
and computer applications make it easy to create these
videos: typically, just a few pictures from social media
accounts are enough. Online communities have formed
to share and request porn deep fakes of individuals and
celebrities, which normalizes the behavior for wouldbe perpetrators. In one case, a mother of a high school
cheerleader created deep fake videos and photos showing her daughter’s rivals on the team naked while smoking and drinking to get them kicked off of the team. A
concern regarding deep fakes videos being used in local
or individual contexts is the difficulty of proving that
they are fake. Without the resources that researchers
and media organizations can bring to bear, individuals
are susceptible to reputational harm, shame, and harassment. While instances like the one above do not pose
significant national security threats to the U.S., they do
create serious civil liberties and privacy concerns and
are likely to be the majority of cases involving deep
fakes.

Deep fake videos provide
unprecedented customization, targeting,
and believability to hostile foreign actors
working to spead disinformation.
Deep fake videos can target politicians, business leaders, minority groups, activists, celebrities, members of
our armed forces, or anyone else in a position of power or influence. Politicians could be displayed taking
bribes or saying racist phrases, and the CEO of a company could be heard talking about a coming recession,
triggering panic selling in the market. A video could
circulate of police officers indiscriminately assaulting
innocent civilians, causing riots across the nation before it can be disproven. According to Special Counsel
Robert S. Mueller III in his 2019 Report on the Investigation
into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, a
major element of the Russian social media campaign in
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the months leading up to the election was to “provoke
and amplify political and social discord in the United
States.” Deep fake videos provide unprecedented customization, targeting, and believability to hostile foreign actors working to spread disinformation.
A video appearing to show House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
slurring her words, almost as if she was drunk, spread
rapidly on social media in 2019, even being tweeted
by former President Trump with the caption, “PELOSI
STAMMERS THROUGH NEWS CONFERENCE” (@realDonaldTrump, May 23, 2019). In truth, Pelosi had not
slurred her words revise: words, and the video was not a
deep fake. Instead, the perpetrators had simply boosted
low frequencies in the audio, prompting House Intelligence Chairman Adam Schiff to refer to the effort as
a "cheap fake." The episode highlights the threat that
deep fake videos pose to our political system and the
rapid speed with which they can be seen and spread
by millions of people. While news organizations were
quick to debunk the video and social media companies
worked to stymie its spread, new questions arose about
what could be next. What if there were no “real” video
to show alongside the fake? What if an accompanying
video emerged a few days later showing that Speaker
Pelosi had actually been drinking? This is the problem
that deep fake videos and audio pose: they create narratives out of whole cloth, with little that can be done to
fight them.

This is the problem that deep fake
videos and audio pose: they create
narratives out of whole cloth, with little
that can be done to fight them.
Deep fake videos pose national security risks for the
United States when they are spread in a foreign context. A video could be created and spread in another
country to show U.S. military personnel engaged in war
crimes or the murder of civilians, leading to increased
radicalization, violence, and resentment against the
U.S. These videos could spread widely before being detected, leaving populations vulnerable to unsuspected
threats. Individuals in other countries may also possess
lower levels of digital literacy, increasing the likelihood
that deep fake videos will be believed. In late 2018 in Gabon, for instance, a video intended to reassure citizens
of President Ali Bongo’s good health was called a deep
fake by his political opponents. They pointed out that
his eyes seemed immobile and did not move in sync with
his jaw. Outside experts following the controversy said
that there was no way to know for sure if the video was
a deep fake, but his opponents launched an unsuccessful
coup as a result of their belief that it was. Similar tactics

could be used around the world to remove U.S.-friendly
leaders or cause allies to reconsider their positions toward the U.S.

Deep Fake Detection and
Countermeasures

Government agencies, independent researchers, and
private companies have created methods and tools able
to detect hyper-realistic deep fake photos, video, and
audio. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has developed two programs to identify and combat
manipulated media: MediFor (media forensics), which
assesses the technical integrity of images or videos, and
SemaFor (semantic forensics), which assesses semantic
issues in manipulated media such as mismatched eye
colors and earring placements. Both Google and Facebook have released data sets of deep fake and real videos in hopes of spurring independent innovation of detection methods. Content publishers like Facebook have
also imposed greater restrictions in the effort to stop
the spread of altered media like deep fakes. However,
these restrictions are quite narrow and hard to apply
due to their strict requirements about how the manipulated media was created and the intent of the poster,
meaning they are likely to be ineffective in fully stopping the threat.
Many deep fakes are low quality and can be easily identified by semantic differences, image quality, and other
oddities. In the Katie Jones LinkedIn profile, for example, researchers quickly identified artifacts that made
the image look distorted and degraded. Common indicators of deep fake images and videos include skin being overly smooth or lacking details, scaliness or blurriness, flickering, odd head positions, face warping, and
unnatural personal patterns of behavior including eye
and lip movements.

When these issues are present, it can
be easy to debunk fake images and
videos; when they are not, more
technical solutions are required.
When these issues are present, it can be easy to debunk
fake images and videos; when they are not, more technical solutions are required. Many of these issues have
already been solved in the latest GAN frameworks, and
CNNs and GANs increasingly make it possible to preserve pose, facial expression and lighting in images and
videos, meaning that detection methods will have to
be constantly updated to compensate. Independent researchers have created several detection techniques of
varying effectiveness and scope; however, more generalized and transferable solutions are still needed.

Deep Fake Photo Detection

One of the most successful methods for detecting deep
fake photos relies on artifacts left behind during the
creation process. In 2019, Durall et al. used high frequency component analysis to detect artifacts hidden
to the human eye indicating that an image may have
been manipulated. The team's model achieved 100% accuracy identifying patterns of fakes during supervised
learning tests—when a team member offered input
and guidance—and 96% accuracy during unsupervised
learning tests. Real and fake images have significantly
different frequencies that allow them to be classified as
either real or fake. While the model struggled to detect
lower-resolution deep fakes, this is not a major issue, as
these images are less convincing and have less potential
to cause harm.
In 2020, Hsu, Zhuang, and Lee used pairwise learning
and a common fake feature network to identify deep
fake photos. The team's study proposed that by using
pairs of images, one real and one fake, they could train
their common fake feature network (CFFN) model to
identify the most common features of deep fake images.
Once the CFFN has been trained to identify the most
common features, it can identify whether new images
are deep fakes. This method works best on fake face detection, as many of the features across different faces
are quite similar, unlike general objects in the world
which vary in shape, size, color, and more. Hsu et al. noted that their CFFN may have trouble identifying deep
fake images if new generators creating new fakes differ
significantly from the generator used to train the CFFN.

Deep Fake Video and Audio Detection

Several video detection methods can be applied to any
deep fake video. In 2019, Korshunov and Marcel used
two detection techniques to examine the susceptibility
of facial recognition software to deep fake face swaps,
with varying degrees of success. First, they found that
facial recognition software failed up to 95% of the time
on deep fake videos, meaning that the software identified the faces in the videos even though they were
face-swapped. To combat this issue, they compared an
audio-visual approach looking at lip-sync and mouth
movements against an image quality technique. They
found that the audio-visual approach was highly ineffective, as the deep fake videos accurately matched mouth
movements with audio. On the other hand, the image
quality technique, which measured signal to noise ratio, blurriness, and other signifiers, was able to identify
deep fake videos with more than 90% accuracy.
A similar technique proposed by Güera and Delp uses
a recurrent neural network with two components: a
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CNN for frame feature extraction and a long short-term
memory for temporal sequence analysis. Given an input
video, the CNN obtains a set of features for each frame.
Next, the features of a consecutive sequence of frames
are combined and analyzed by the long short-term
memory to produce a likelihood estimate for the probability of a video being a deep fake or not. Their method
achieved accuracies greater than 97%, even using less
than two seconds of video. This robust and generalized
detection method and its ability to achieve high accuracies given low amounts of input will be important to
consider in future detection research.
A more specifically tailored deep fake video detection
method was proposed by Agarwal et al. to protect world
leaders against deep fakes. They extracted data about
the facial and head movements from hundreds of hours
of footage of U.S. politicians including Barack Obama,
Donald Trump, and Bernie Sanders. They found that the
specific movements of each individual were quite different, meaning that they could be used to identify that
individual. Agarwal et al. then trained a model on both
real videos and deep fake videos of each of the leaders
and found an average accuracy of 91% across the three
main types of deep fake videos. However, their model’s
accuracy dropped to between 61%–66% for videos where
the speaker was not facing the camera. Techniques like
this reveal innovative ways that deep fakes can be detected, but it is unlikely that they can be generalized or
used to combat deep fakes not targeting famous people.

Implications

On April 26, 2020, the first deep fake targeting the 2020
U.S. election spread widely on Twitter and was retweeted by President Donald Trump. The deep fake, a gif of
Vice President Joe Biden raising his eyebrows and rolling his tongue around, originated from a Twitter account called “@SilERabbit” that mainly posted messages
in favor of Bernie Sanders, who had dropped out of the
Democratic Party's presidential primaries on April 8.
While Trump had amplified edited media before, such
as the Nancy Pelosi slurring video, this instance was
different in that the content was completely fabricated.
Journalist David Frum pointed out in The Atlantic that
Trump’s retweet “looks like an experimental test of the
rules of social media.” It is not clear how the deep fake
of Biden appeared in Trump’s timeline or if it was sent
to him by someone else, but it raises questions if the
spread was orchestrated by foreign actors.
This incident may be a sign of a larger shift in how disinformation campaigns since the 2016 election postmortem are being carried out. While the Russian operation
to interfere in the 2016 election succeeded in co-opting
48
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and influencing news coverage and in engaging many
American voters' attention, it failed in that the operation was detected and exposed in great detail. The Russians covered their tracks poorly, leaving behind online
transactions, email accounts, correspondence, and other
digital identifiers that allowed investigators to paint a
detailed picture of the operation and to secure multiple indictments against the perpetrators. In the wake
of this exposure, Russia and other foreign actors have
sought to increase deniability and believability by outsourcing their operations. In 2019, the New York Times
reported that “Rather than impersonating Americans as
they did in 2016, Russian operatives are working to get
Americans to repeat disinformation."

While the goals and content have
remained constant, the tactics have
changed, making it harder to track
the origin of disinformation and the
perpetrators behind it.
Evidence of the shift in Russian tactics has emerged
in Africa over the past year. In late October 2019, Facebook removed three networks of accounts that had been
spreading disinformation in Mozambique, Cameroon,
Sudan, and Libya. These accounts were linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, who the U.S. indicted for meddling in the
2016 election. A 2020 CNN investigation found that Russian operatives linked to the Internet Research Agency
have outsourced the actual running of accounts and
posting to workers in nations like Ghana and Nigeria.
These Russian-backed trolls have posted content targeted towards Americans to incite racial tensions and social unrest. While the goals and content have remained
constant, the tactics have changed, making it harder to
track the origin of disinformation and the perpetrators
behind it.
While deep fakes today are usually easy to spot, they
may not be in the future. Research into detection algorithms must at least match the development of creation
algorithms. In turn, social media companies like Twitter
and Facebook will need to employ these techniques at
scale on their platforms. Major news organizations and
other groups focused on fighting disinformation and
providing transparency in technology will also need to
adopt them.
The emergence of deep fakes presents many immediate
challenges, but the broader issue is the continuing and
deepening challenge to truth in our discourse. The U.S.
is already incredibly divided by partisan rhetoric and
media organizations that spread tensions across the political spectrum. Foreign actors further inflame these

tensions, leading to greater distrust in institutions and
a lack of regard for the truth. Citron and Chesney refer
to this deepening spiral as the "liar's dividend," in which
citizens' growing awareness of deep fakes makes it increasingly easy to question the truth in any situation. As
the public becomes more aware that deep fakes could be
anywhere, they "may have difficulty believing what their
eyes or ears are telling them—even when the information is real."

It is unclear whether this new
reality of disinformation, charged
rhetoric, and increasing skepticism is
a fleeting element of the moment
or if it is here to stay.
Americans have rarely vested full faith in their government, its institutions, and the media who report on both,
but recent shifts in information and discourse have been
rapid and startling. Accusations of “fake news,” a term
all but unheard of before 2016, are levied against all
critical reporting by those who hold positions of power,
no matter how valid. It is unclear whether this new reality of disinformation, charged rhetoric, and increased
skepticism is a fleeting element of the moment or if it
is here to stay, but deep fakes are certainly accelerating
their influence on American discourse.
The fight for truth in American discourse faces a grim
future. At the same time that foreign influence campaigns are becoming less expensive to operate and more
successful in their reach and effect, the algorithms and
programs used to create deep fakes are advancing much
more rapidly than detection algorithms, regulations,
laws, and societal demand for change. Russia may have
invented the playbook in 2016 for successful online disinformation campaigns, but other nations and groups
have been quick to adopt Russia's strategies. The Intelligence Community has already assessed that Iran
and China have ramped up their election interference
schemes, but disinformation does not stop at our elections.1 Socio-political developments like the COVID-19
pandemic provide opportunities for malicious actors to
spread disinformation and increase political tensions
and polarization in the U.S. Deep fakes increase the
potential damage of disinformation campaigns in too
many imaginable ways, providing unprecedented believability to complete fabrications.
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